

U.S. Foreign Policy: Problems and Challenges for 1963

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It is fashionable at this time of year to talk of new chapters, of turning points. This year it is not only fashionable but extremely pertinent. As we look from January 1963 into the future, we are struck first by how much of the past is indeed past. Consider for a moment what has happened to our world in the relatively few years since the war. The four basic impulses that have dominated international affairs since 1945 have come either to an end, to clear turning points, or to a state of major transformation.

I refer to the reconstruction of Europe, the dismantling of the colonial system that prevailed over much of the earth for more than two centuries, the almost unchallenged physical domination of the free world by the United States, and the emergence of the cold war. Each of these basic impulses has either ended, to be replaced by new forces and circumstances, or has been so altered in character as to represent a break between the recent past and a future that has already begun. I do not want to be misunderstood when I include in this list the cold war: it is still very much with us, and will be for much time to come, but profound changes have been taking place within the system that mounted that political war effort and within the West's capacities and opportunities for waging it.

It can be said that these basic impulses have changed more than our own reflexes or the vocabulary with which we think and talk about

the problems and challenges which confront the United States in world affairs.

While thinking in old terms and talking with old slogans, we have carried—and have been carried—into an era of new chapters, of new adventures—and of new risks. As these new chapters begin to unfold, we will find ourselves in the state of mind of the old-time Chicago newspaper editor who one day called his staff together and decreed: "What this newspaper needs is some new clichés."

It is possible that the Western World today stands, politically and economically, on the verge of a great release of energy and organizational genius that has a certain parallel to the great outburst of geographical and intellectual exploration after the Crusades, when Europe propelled itself around the globe.

The analogy is tricky and can easily be overblown. What I mean is that we have before us a year or more of uncharted waters, many of them uncharted; a year of many unknowns that may require of political and economic leaders the same degree of imagination, daring—and hardship—that carried the Magellans, the Vespuccis, the Hudsons, the Marco Polos out into the uncharted frontiers of their own civilization.

Of the many big unknowns that inexorably will be evolving into known quantities in the months to come, these are among the most important:

What will be the course of the Soviet-Chinese ideological split, and what opportunities or dangers will it present to the free world?

What will be the shape of Europe and the Common Market? Related to that, how will the alliance solve its internal differences and

¹Address made before the Broome County World Affairs Council at Binghamton, N.Y., on Jan. 11 (press release 214).

the globe, make us further dependent on our allies to carry a greater share of the burden. They can now afford it.

This resital—and there could be more—is not designed to suggest the likelihood of a retrenched American foreign policy but rather to dramatize the inevitability of the historic trend which the President described in his July 4 address on Atlantic interdependence.⁴ That trend to increasing military, diplomatic, and economic cohesion between the Western Europeans, the North Americans, and Japan is the Atlantic wave of the future. In months to come there will be many manifestations of differences, of discord, perhaps even fallings-out among allies over given problems and issues. But it is important that these squalls of choppy water not be mistaken for the big wave which, in the opinion of many who shape policy here and across the Atlantic, is the inexorable one.

One must be wary of euphoria on this point. There are difficult interludes ahead as we try to work out with our allies solutions to problems that perplex them, or us, or both of us. If, by some misfortune, negotiations between Britain and the Common Market fail, drastic improvisations may be necessary to avoid serious corrosion within the entire alliance. If, as we hope, these negotiations succeed, the United States, Canada, and Japan must be prepared for adjustments at home that may be onerous for some in their midst. They must be prepared, too, with imaginative programs for helping to assure that the beneficent energy of the Common Market is not turned inward but outward, to ease the fears and enhance the opportunities of the underdeveloped countries.

There will be long and complicated ramifications as we attempt to work out, in a manner acceptable to the allies and ourselves, an answer to the European desire to have a greater share in the control of the nuclear power that now rests so largely with us.

The Nassau agreement with Britain is a large step toward the attainment of a multilateral arrangement. But many more steps will be required and many more, probably several years, before it can be expected to be followed.

In some ways this most complex of problems, bristly with conflicting national prides and ambitions, may yet prove the most beneficial because it dramatizes more clearly the D'Artagnan indivisibility of the free world's position—in a nuclear showdown it is quite simply "all for one and one for all." The logic of this illuminates the logic of increasing interdependence in all fields.

We cannot altogether look ahead without looking briefly backward—to Cuba, to the recent Chinese Communist aggression against India, to the long-building rift within the Communist bloc.

The Experience in Cuba

Cuba has many meanings for us and, one hopes, for the Soviet Union. It suggests that in the nuclear age the willingness to use power is the first requisite of the avoidance of the actual use of those weapons. It demonstrated that the Soviet Union was capable of a gross misreading of American reaction to a politico-military invasion of this hemisphere. It raised the perplexing question—as did Korea, the Communist coup of Czechoslovakia, the infiltration of Viet-Nam—of how accurately the Kremlin assesses the will and capabilities of the West to resist aggression. It showed, in the reaction of unaligned capitals around the world, that when the chips are down there is a really much neutralist. A huge part of the world shared relief and admiration at the calm, considered way the Americans were forced to back their offensive weapons out of Cuba. It galvanized free-world unity, as demonstrated in the unanimous support of the Organization of American States and the support of our other allies.

It is not prudent to conclude that what went down in Cuba will serve in another, much further from American power and closer to Communist power. Nor should there be a high expectation that one such setback will prevent Russian-Soviet aims in the many other parts of the world where Western interest cannot be negligible. It is possible, however, that the Cuban experience may provoke more caution on the part of Soviet leaders.

Admittedly, Cuba is not finished. Several

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 101.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1961, p. 41.

tion and Soviet military personnel, nor do we want to see those troops out of there. And Castro remains, with his Marxist-Leninist creed on the Cuban people depending heavily on Soviet helplessness for its continuation. For as long as communism remains on the island, nor is it on leave in the Caribbean.

The Crisis Within Communism

As a last stop in this perhaps too ambitious tour of the horizon, consider the ideological eruption within the Communist bloc. It is difficult for Western observers—and probably for Communist observers—to predict where this will end and how. It was not too long ago that the experts were insisting on their “fundamental unity” of the bloc. Now we see the monolith riven by a quarrel between China and Russia that many consider to be irresolvable. Obviously a rift in the bloc weakens the power and the appeal of communism; it means more difficulties for Moscow, and it robs Peking of its large source of the materials and the support it needs to convert its failures into the beginnings of successes. In months to come the dissonance may have serious effect on morale and direction within Communist parties all over the world. Two words of caution, however, about this crisis within communism:

First, the West cannot be certain that a complete rift, unharnessing a hate-propelled, unrelenting Communist China from the comparative restraints of Soviet Russia, will be a good thing for the West. Second, it should be kept in mind that this is still chiefly an ideological quarrel, not over *whether* communism will bury us but *how* communism will bury us. The desire to perform the burial ceremony still exists as strongly in Moscow as in Peking.

With these reservations in mind, the Chinese-Russian dispute adds significantly to the dilemma that now faces communism. From Moscow's point of view, the road ahead must seem to consist of three possible forks:

One, a continued expansion of military force in order to persist in assuming great risks, as they have been doing in recent years in Berlin and Cuba, while continuing to press aggressively for the breaks in the underdeveloped areas.

Two, a contention that the armaments race is a costly, dangerous, and hopeless course, that it must be halted, at the expense of some concession to the West in disarmament, in order to transfer strained resources to agriculture, consumer goods, and industrial production.

Three, a pause, in which to reduce international tension and tackle some of the many urgent problems confronting the Soviet leadership and to provide time for choice as to which other fork to follow.

The West must, of course, equip itself to cope with any of these alternatives. If, as some believe, the third course is the one Moscow is now choosing; if, as some believe, Soviet leaders are inclined to more caution; if, as many believe, the Communist system cannot shoulder its own and the internal problems and the massive burden of the continuing nuclear arms buildup—if all these probabilities are at work, the West is moving into a time when it can push strongly forward with its huge task of international architecture.

What Is Required of Americans?

Another full speech could be devoted to a discussion of what precisely this task requires of Americans. Instead, let us consider briefly a few of the more evident needs.

First, to get our own house in order. Integration has moved at little more than a token pace in America. In the words of Secretary Rush, “. . . these problems of discrimination here in our own country are the largest single burden we bear in the conduct of our foreign relations.”⁶ It is time we got on with it and lightened that unfair burden.

It is time, too, to substitute for sterile debate over “win” and “no-win” policies a truly constructive dialog to attain objectives that are unanimously shared by Americans. It is not enough to complain, for example, about a “mess in Laos” or “chaos in the Congo.” There must be an honest facing up to alternatives.

Also we have much to do at home to stimulate our economy to productivity and efficiency. Sensible tax reforms, an imaginative use of the new tools in the Trade Expansion Act, tangible

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1962, p. 907.

actions to improve our lagging social and health processes—these are but a few of the steps that are necessary to the national trimness and health without which we are not going to run the race that is being demanded of us.

Surely few of us are satisfied with the pallid state of American education. We are not educating for the future. As Walter Lippmann puts it: "As we fail to educate adequately one generation of school children, the evil results of this failure do not appear fully until these children grow up and become the uneducated parents of a still less educated generation."

Finally we must look with fresh, if sharp, eyes at the uses and needs for economic aid in foreign policy. It is understandable that after all these years of dispensing foreign aid there should be fatigue, impatience, even some disillusionment over the results—understandable but not tolerable. Foreign aid is a major instrument of American foreign policy. Foreign policy in turn is simply the means of protecting and furthering the American interest. The program has suffered in recent years; it is going to suffer to the point of mutilation this year unless Americans find it in themselves to inspire a rededication to the proposition that a great part of the power of the world's richest nation lies in its ability constructively, and self-interestedly, to apply that power where it will do most for freedom. The public has a right to expect an increasingly hardheaded, realistic aid program from the administration. The administration for its part has the right to expect enlightened support from the public.

History, as the President wrote recently, is what men make of it. There has never been a more challenging year in which to make it. Having begun with many questions, I should like to conclude with one: Are we going to do it?

U.S. Makes Short-Term Credit Available to Brazil

Press release of 19 October 1962, January 7

Following consultations with Ambassador Roberto Campos, acting on behalf of the Brazilian Government, the U.S. Government is making available a short-term credit totaling

\$30 million to Brazil, which is repayable in 90 days.

The Brazilian Government has stated that it is preparing definite plans and measures for putting into force, beginning early 1963, an effective program to limit inflationary pressures as well as a development plan designed to support strong and balanced economic growth. Certain actions in line with this objective have already been taken, including particularly the approval in November 1962 of legislation designed to help in reducing the potential Government budget deficit in 1963 and to initiate a broad reform of Brazil's tax structure and collection machinery.

The Government of Brazil has indicated its intention to initiate, at an early date, discussions with the United States, other countries, and appropriate international financial institutions both in order to describe the measures it is planning to take to achieve financial recovery and assure sustained economic growth as well as with a view to exploring what external financial support may be available to supplement the Brazilian effort.

United States Assures Saudi Arabia of Support and Friendship

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia.

White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated January 8

OCTOBER 25, 1962

YOUR HIGHNESS: As Your Highness assumes new and important responsibilities upon returning to Saudi Arabia, I wish to recall your visit to the White House on October 5.¹ I then stated, and I want it understood clearly, that Saudi Arabia can depend upon the friendship and the cooperation of the United States in dealing with the many tasks which lie before it in the days ahead. The United States has deep and abiding interest in Saudi Arabia and in the stability and progress of Saudi Arabia. Under your firm and enlightened leadership I

¹For text of a joint communique, see *HERALD* of Oct. 20, 1962, p. 611.